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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CAR DOCTOR, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

No. 17239

ANTHONY BELMONT and
GREGORY OLINYK,
Defendants and
Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover $25,000.00 paid by plaintiff to defendants as a contribution for a proposed partnership.

Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to return of the

funds on the basis of an agreement among the parties that certain conditions would be met before the partnership would become
effective and that those conditions were not met.

Defendants

counterclaimed alleging that plaintiff had failed to meet a
commitment to provide additional financing, thereby causing
loss of certain business opportunities.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court and judgment was entered
in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $25,000.00, plus interest
and costs; the defendants' counterclaim was dismissed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-1Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In about February of 1977, the officers of plaintiff
Car Doctor, Inc., David Robinson and Gordon Giles, met the
defendants, Gregory Olinyk and Anthony Belmont.
lines 9-30; R. 106, lines 1-10.)

(R. 105,

The parties began negotia-

tions concerning the formation of a partnership to operate a
private liquor club and restaurant in Ogden, Utah.

(R. 106,

lines 20-30.)
On March 4, 1977, the parties executed a preliminary
agreement (Exhibit 3-P)

setting forth certain conditions which,

must be met before any partnership among the parties would be·
come effective.

The agreement also provided that if the

I

co~~/

tions were not met, monies contributed by plaintiff would~
refunded.

On that same day, plaintiff delivered a check in

amount of $10,000.00, payable to defendant Gregory Olinyk
(Exhibit 1-P).

The check was delivered to Olinyk and made

payable to him based on his representations that the opportuni:.
contemplated for the operation of the partnership business wou'.
be lost if monies were not paid immediately.
23-27.; R.

(R.

107, lines

108, lines 14-19.)

As a substitute for placing the funds in escrow, and because of the immediate need for cash, defendant Olinyk executes
and delivered a promissory note in the amount of $10, 000 · OO to

-2-
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plaintiff to guarantee repayment of the funds if the partnership did not become effective.
R.

(Exhibit 2-P)

(R. 109, line 30;

110, lines 1-5, 21-27.)
On March 9, 1977, the parties executed an agreement to

govern the operation of the partnership once the conditions
were met.

(Attachment to Exhibit 3-P.)

On March 11, 1977, plaintiff delivered a check to defendant Anthony Belmont, in the amount of $15,000.00, made payable
to defendant Belmont.

(Exhibit 4-P.)

Again, defendants repre-

sented to plaintiff's officers that there was an urgent and
inunediate need for funds.

In addition, defendants indicated

that the five (5) conditions set forth in the agreement (Exhibit
3-P) could not be met until the private liquor club, to be known
as the Winery, was open and operating and that the club could
not be open unless plaintiff provided the funds inunediately.
(R.

114, lines 17-25.)
The five conditions set forth in Exhibit 3-P were never

met.

(R. 116, lines 26-30; R. 117, lines 1-2; Findings of Fact,

no. 3.)
This action was filed in June of 1977.

Defendants Olinyk

and Belmont continued to operate the business until August of
1977.

(R. 182, lines 24-25.)
During the time the Winery was operated, plaintiff's

officers were never allowed to examine its books and records.
(R. 118, lines 17-20; R. 147, lines 24-30.)
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ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PARTNERSHIP l'IAS
NOT EFFECTIVE IS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The Court has repeatedly held that in a case tried

~

the court, when the findings of the trial court are based oc
substantial evidence, this Court will not disturb them on arr,;
unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary. 5,
~·

Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P.2d 393 (Utah 1977); Zions Firs:

National Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 534
900

(Utah 1975).

P.2~

In this case, appellants have not argued L:

the findings of the trial court that the agreed conditions we:,
never fulfilled and the partnership did not become ef fecti~
were not based on substantial, admissible and competent evid1':
(Findings of Fact, nos.

3 and 7.)

Instead, appellants argue that either there was de~
compliance with the conditions or a waiver of them.
Brief, pg. 4.)

(Appell;:.:

In support of those propositions, appellants

cite certain isolated aspects of testimony.

However, as the

foregoing statement of facts indicates, the record contains
substantial evidence that the conditions had not been met. I:.
addition, defendant Belmont himself testified that conditiOO
was not met (R. 178,

lines

4-10)

and that condition 4 was no:

satisfied (R. 104, lines 12-20.)
As to the issue whether plaintiff waived performan~c
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the conditions, appellants have cited no direct evidence in
support of their argument that performance of the conditions
was waived.

This Court has held that "waiver must be an inten-

tional relinquishment of a known right".

Bjork v. April

Industries, Inc., 547 P.2d 219, 220 (Utah 1976).

Nothing

in the record supports the contention that plaintiff's
officers intentionally relinquished plaintiff's right to
performance of the conditions set forth in the agreement.
This Court has held that, on appeal, it must view the
evidence, including the fair inferences to be drawn therefrom,
in the light most favorable to the successful party below.
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977).

The infer-

ences to be drawn from the evidence in this case do not support
appellant's contentions that the conditions had been met or
waived.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE PARTNERSHIP BECAME EFFECTIVE.
Appellants argue that plaintiff is estopped by its conduct from denying the existence of a partnership.

As their sole

legal authority for that proposition, appellants cite Utah Code
~ §48-1-13

(Repl. Vol. 1970).

That section provides as

follows:

-5-
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When a person by words spoken or written or
by conduct represents himself, or consents
to another's representing him, to anyone as
a partner, in an existing partnership or
with one or more people not actual partners,
he is liable to any such person to whom such
representation has been made who has on the
faith of such representation given credit
to the actual or apparent partnership, and,
if he has made such representation or consented to its being made in a public manner,
he is liable to such person, whether the
representation has or has not been made or
communicated to such person so giving credit
by, or with the knowledge of, the apparent
partner making the representation or consenting
to its being made.
The obvious purpose of this section is to guarantee tt"'
one who holds himself out as a partner in a partnership and
thereby induces third persons to grant credit to the partnership will be liable for partnership obligations.

Nothing in

I
the statute is directed toward determining rights and obligati::!

I

as between and among the partners themselves.
Plaintiff, through its agents, did nothing in this case
to represent to defendants that the partnership was effectiw.
In their counterclaim, defendants did not even seek to recover
for amounts defendant Belmont may have expended for payment oi
trade creditors of the operations of the Winery.

Nor was a

partnership tax return filed.
Appellants seek to rely on certain actions undertaken b
plaintiff's agents which appellants contend amount to particico
tion in the partnership business and creating an appearance
the existence of a partnership.

-6-
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0

these actions might have been sufficient to create liability
on plaintiff's part to third persons who extended credit to
a supposed partnership is not before the Court.

Appellants

acted with full knowledge of the situation and the existence
of the agreement and could not have been said to have relied
on the actions of plaintiff's agents.

Neither appellant testi-

fied that plaintiff's officers represented by words or conduct
that plaintiff would not require full performance of the conditions.
This Court has held that an estoppel may occur when conduct by one party leads another party, in reliance on the conduct,
to adopt a course of action which results in detriment if the
first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct.
Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977).

Carnesecca v.

Appellants have not argued

that plaintiff's agents led them to believe that plaintiff would
not seek to enforce defendants' obligations under the preliminary
agreement (Exhibit 3-P) .
Appellants contend that the participation of plaintiff's
officers in the operation of the Winery was so extensive that
that conduct is sufficient to create an estoppel to deny the
existence of a partnership.

However, the conduct of plaintiff's

officers is consistent with their testimony that defendants represented that there was a great need for haste in opening and operating the private club.

Moreover, plaintiff's participation in

that operation occurred, for the most part, at the beginning of

-7-
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the operation.

For example, plaintiff's officers assisted

preparing the premises for opening

(R.

..
1

124, lines 18-25) and

acted as greeters during the grand opening (R. 124, lines

2: ...

During the time the Winery oi:erated, however, plaintiff's

o::.!

were not allowed to examine i ':s books and records and in fact
in April or May were excluded from the club so that they wou:•
not "interfere" with its operations.

(R. 191, lines 3-11).

In addition, even after plaintiff filed this action
June of 1977, defendants continued to operate the club.
Olinyk testified that in July he made a $10,000.00

214,

lines 16-21.)

~~~
I

1

contrib~t::

to the operation as required by the agreement signed in
(R. 218, lines 26-30; R.

1:

r~r~.

It is difficult·,

understand how those actions could be said to have been unde:·I
taken in reliance on plaintiff's participation once the laws·J

I

had been filed.

:j

Throughout the short time period that the Winery oper 0

I

defendants acted with full knowledge of plaintiff's status ar.:
the status of the proposed partnership.

For that reason, the

I

limited participation by plaintiff's officers in the ear~ 5 ~
of the club's operation cannot support an estoppel.
CONCLUSION
The trial court found that defendants agreed to
satisfy certain conditions before a partnership would beco~
effective and that those conditions were never met.
a~e

supported by substantial evidence.

At the trial, appell)
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Those f:·I
I

argued that the conditions were waived and that plaintiff
should be estopped to deny the existence of a partnership.
Having considered those arguments in the light of the evidence,
the trial court determined that the partnership did not become
effective.

Nothing in the record compels this Court to overturn

those findings.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.
DATED this

1st day of December, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA, ZIMMERMAN & MAYCOCK
620 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

··'/!)-

/le,_

I ----· ---

B Y~·~_;/-~~:....<;::.,.,',.,,:;;.,..,,~;--~-:-'~~~~~~

ELLEN MAYCOCK
I
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct
of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent to Mr. Geoq
Speciale, 44 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111,
prepaid, this 1st day of December, 1980.
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